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486 STANG v. CITY OF MILL VALLEY [38 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18485. In Bank. Feb. 21, 1952.] 
P. A. STANG et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF lVIII,L VALLEY 
et al., Respondents. 
[1] Municipal Corporations-Torts-Governmental Functions.-
Fire-fighting is a governmental function, and in the absence 
of statute neither a municipality nor its officers are liable in 
tort for failure to discharge a duty with respect thereto. 
[2] !d.-Torts-Liability Under Public Liability Act.-While the 
Public Liability Act (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now 
Gov. Code, § 53051) imposes liability where the city is using 
dangerous or defective property and injury is proximately 
caused thereby, it does not impose liability on a city for 
failure, resulting from a clogged water pipe, to extinguish a 
fire. 
[3] !d.-Torts-Governmental Functions.-Failure of a govern-
mental function involves the denial of a benefit owing to the 
community as a whole, but it does not constitute a wrong or 
injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right of 
individual redress, which right must be predicated on the 
violation of a duty of care owed to the injured party. 
[4] !d.-Torts-Failure to Extinguish Fires.-A municipal cor-
poration is not responsible at common law for destruction of 
property within its limits by a fire which it did not set, merely 
because, through the negligence or other default of the mu-
nicipality or its employees, the members of the fire department 
failed to extinguish the fire. 
[5] !d.-Torts-Negligence in Administration of Fire Protection. 
-A municipal corporation is not liable under the Public 
Liability Act (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5619; now Gov. 
Code, § 53051) for destruction of a house by fire as a result of 
a clogged fire hydrant and water main, thus making it im-
possible to obtain sufficient water to quench the fire, there 
being no language in the statute which may be construed as 
[1] Fire department as pertaining to governmental or to pro-
prietary branch of municipality, notes, 9 A.L.R. 143; 33 A.L.R. 688; 
84 A.L.R. 514. See, also, Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 345; 
Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 572. 
[ 4] Liability of municipality for fire loss due to its failure to 
provide or maintain adequate water supply or pressure, note, 163 
A.L.R. 348. See, also, Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 626. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, §§ 436, 440; 
[2] Municipal Corporations, § 438; [3] Municipal Corporations, 
§ 440; [ 4, 5] Municipal Corporations, § 447.5. 
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intending to impose a greater liability on the city than would 
prevail against an individual or a private corporation charged 
with negligence in the administraton of fire protection . 
.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County. Edward I. Butler, Judge. .Affirmed . 
.Action against city and city officials for damage by fire 
due to failure to maintain fire-fighting equipment in usable 
condition. Judgments for defendants affirmed. 
Charles Reach for .Appellants. 
Thomas C. Nelson, City Attorney (Mill Valley) for Re-
spondents. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City .Attorney (Los .Angeles), Gilmore 
Tillman, Chief Assistant City .Attorney for Water and Power, 
and 0. M. Lloyd, Deputy City .Attorney, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.--Plaintiffs brought this action to recover dam-
ages suffered as the result of a fire on their property, claiming 
liability against the city and its officials by reason of. their 
failure to maintain certain fire-fighting equipment in condition 
for effective use in extinguishing· said fire. (Public Liability 
.Act, Stats. 1923, ch. 328, § 2, p. 675; 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, 
.Act 5619; now found in Gov. Code, § 53051.) Defendants 
filed a general and special demurrer to the amended com-
plaint. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. 
Plaintiffs declined to plead further and judgment accordingly 
was entered for defendants, from which plaintiffs appeal. 
Consideration of the facts alleged compels the conclusion 
that the cited act does not justify the imposition of liability 
upon defendants in this case, and that the judgment must 
be affirmed. 
From the amended complaint it appears that plaintiffs, 
husband and wife, owned certain real property, with a resi-
dence thereon, in the city of Mill Valley; and that on .August 
8, 1946, without their fault, a small fire ignited the roof 
of their premises. Plaintiffs allege that for more than one 
year prior to the fire, defendants-the city, the city manager 
and fire chief-knew that the water lines leading to the fire 
hydrant adjacent to plaintiffs' property, and the fire hydrant 
itself, had become clogged with refuse and were incapable of 
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providing sufficient water for effective fire control; that it 
was the duty of defendants, and city funds were available, 
to remedy that situation, but nothing was done in that 
regard; that upon outbreak of the fire on plaintiffs' property, 
the fire department was called and its fire-fighting apparatus 
arrived in time, had water been available through the clogged 
mains and hydrant, to have extinguished the fire before it 
would have caused damage to exceed $25; that no other source 
of water was available nor was the fire department equipped 
with chemical apparatus sufficient to put out a minor fire ; 
that because of the inability of the fire department to secure 
water from the water mains and hydrant, the fire spread, 
causing damage to the house and personal property of plaintiffs 
totalling $9,563.50; that this damage was "the direct and 
proximate result of the failure of defendants to discharge 
their duties'' and to remedy the ''defective condition of said 
public works and property.'' In joining the city manager and 
fire chief as defendants, plaintiffs allege that each had control 
of the fire-fighting apparatus, and had the authority and 
duty of maintaining such equipment in usable condition. 
[1] The determinative question is whether plaintiffs' al-
legations constitute a cause of action against defendants. It 
is conceded that fire-fighting is a governmental function ( 63 
C.J.S. § 776, p. 81), and that in the absence of statute, neither 
a municipality nor its officers are liable in tort for failure to 
discharge a duty arising from a governmental function. 
(Miller v. City of Palo Alto, 208 Cal. 74, 75-76 [280 P. 108]; 
see 18 Cal.Jur. § 345, p. 1094, and cases cited; annos. 9 A.L.R. 
143, 33 A.L.R. 688, 84 A.L.R. fi14.) As authority for their 
action plaintiffs rely on section 2 of the Public Liability Act 
of 1923, which read: ''Counties, municipalities and school 
districts shall be liable for injuries to persons and property 
resulting from the dangerous or defective condition of public 
streets, highways, buildings, grounds, works and property 
in all cases where the governing . . . board of such county, 
municipality . . . or other board, officer or person having 
authority to rem~dy such condition, had knowledge or notice 
of the defective or dangerous condition of any such ... 
works or property and failed or neglected, for a reasonable 
time after acquiring such knowledge or receiving such notice, 
to remedy such condition or . . . to take such action as may 
be reasonably necessary to protect the public against such 
dangerous or defective condition." (Stats. 1923, ch. 328, 
§ 2, p. 675.) 
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[2] The ordinary case coming within the terms of this act 
involves a situation where the injured person is using some 
type of city property that is dangerous or defective, and 
which he had a legal right to use, such as public streets 
(Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196 [157 P.2d 625, 
158 A..L.R. 625]), highways (McLaughlin v. City of Los 
Angeles, 60 Cal.A.pp.2d 241 [140 P.2d 416) ), buildings (Gib-
son v. County of Mendocino, 16 Cal.2d 80 [105 P.2d 105]), 
bridges (Bosqui v. San Bernardino, 2 Cal.2d 747 [43 P.2d 
547]), school grounds (Bridge v. Board of Education, 2 Cal. 
A.pp.2d 398 [ 38 P .2d 199] ) , or other similar property ( Bau-
man v. San Francisco, 42 Cal.A.pp.2d 144 [108 P.2d 989]). 
Likewise the act sustains the imposition of liability in the 
situation where the city is using the dangerous or defective 
property and injury was proximately caused thereby: Pittam 
v. City of Riverside, 128 Cal.A.pp. 57 [16 P.2d 768], and 
Osborn v. City of Whittier, 103 Cal.A.pp.2d 609 [230 P.2d 132], 
where the city negligently allowed a fire to spread from a 
city dump; Durante v. City of Oakland, 19 Cal.A.pp.2d 543 
[65 P.2d 1326], where the city used defective sewer pipes, 
resulting in the flooding of plaintiffs' property; Knight v. City 
of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 764 [160 P.2d 779], where the city 
negligently installed and maintained street drainage facilities, 
causing an overflow on plaintiffs' property with damage to 
the improvements thereon. But here the city did not create 
the fire causing the damage to plaintiffs' property; rather 
the claimed fault lies in defendants' failure to provide the 
means for remedying a condition otherwise created-a different 
set of circumstances to which plaintiffs seek to apply the act 
in support of their action. · 
[3] Upon analysis, it clearly appears that the gravamen 
of plaintiffs' complaint is the failure of a governmental func-
tion. Such failure involves the denial of a benefit owing to 
the community as a whole, but it does not constitute a wrong 
or injury to a member thereof so as to give rise to a right 
of individual redress (Restatement of Torts, § 288), which 
right must be predicated upon the violation of a duty of care 
owed to the injured party. (Neuber v. Royal Realty Co., 
86 Cal.A.pp.2d 596, 612 [195 P.2d 501] .) [4] .A.s the main-
tenance and operation of a fire department is so distinguished 
as a governmental function for the public good, it is ''well 
settled that a municipal corporation is not responsible for the 
destruction of property within its limits by a fire which it 
did not set, merely because, through the negligence or other 
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default of the corporation or its employees, the members of 
the fire department failed to extinguish the fire.'' ( 38 .Am.J ur. 
§ 626, p. 327.) This common-law rule of nonliability of a 
municipality has been specifically applied in cases where the 
fire loss vvas due to an insufficient supply of water because of 
negligence in the upkeep of the city's waterworks system, in 
that water pipes and hydrants became clogged and fell into 
disrepair. (.Anno. 163 .A.L.R. 348, 356-357.) Therefore it 
must be determined whether the cited statute, which is the 
measure of the waiver of governmental immunity, encompasses 
the liability which plaintiffs seek to impose. 
Closely parallel in its facts and legal principles is the 
case of Steitz v. City of Beacon (1945), 295 N.Y. 51 [64 N.E.2d 
704, 163 .A.L.R. 342], where the city was authorized by charter 
to construct and operate a system of waterworks and to main-
tain a fire department. A legislative enactment had waived 
the sovereign immunity of the city, making it liable equally 
with individuals and private corporations for the wrongs of 
its officers and employees. Plaintiffs brought an action against 
the city for damages suffered in the course of a fire which 
destroyed their property. They predicated the city's liability 
upon an alleged defective condition in its fire-fighting equip-
ment arising from the failure to keep in repair .a "pressure 
and flow regulating valve" in the water system, with the 
result that there was provided an insufficient quantity of 
water to combat effectively the fire. In holding the case to turn 
on the question of "whether the facts alleged would be suffi-
cient to constitute a cause of action against an individual under 
the same duties as those impotJed upon the city solely because 
of failure to protect ·property from destruction by fire which 
was started by another,'' the court at page 705 succinctly said: 
''There was no agreement in this case to put out the fire or 
make good the loss, and so liability is predicated solely upon 
the . . . provisions of the city's charter defining its powers 
of government. Quite obviously these provisions were not in 
terms designed to protect the personal interest of any indi-
vidual and clearly were designed to secure the benefits of 
well ordered municipal government enjoyed by all as members 
of the community. There was indeed a public duty to main-
tain a fire department, but that was all, and there was no sug-
gestion that for any omission in keeping hydrants, valves or 
pipes in repair the people of the city could recover fire damages 
to their property. 
''.An intention to impose upon the city the crushing burden 
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of such an obligation should not be imputed to the Legislature 
in the absence of language clearly designed to have that 
effect.'' 
As further support for its conclusion as to the city's non-
liability under the described circumstances, the court referred 
to the "controlling" decision in Mock Co. v. Rensselaer Water 
Co., 247 N.Y. 160 [159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199], where a 
private vvater company, under ''a positive statutory duty'' 
to supply water to a city, was charged with the "failure to 
furnish sufficient water under adequate pressure to extinguish 
the fire before it reached plaintiffs' [property]." As said in 
the Steitz opinion (64 N.E.2d at p. 707), the court in the 
Moch case held that "the action could not be maintained for 
a tort at common law or for a breach of statutory duty be-
cause the duty was owing to the city and not to its inhabitants 
and because the failure to furnish an adequate supply of 
water was at most the denial of a benefit and was not the 
commission of a wrong.'' Accordingly, the court in the Steitz 
case refused to construe the statutory waiver of sovereign 
immunity to contemplate the imposition of a greater liability 
on the city than would exist against an individual or private 
corporation charged with like negligence for failure to main-
tain its fire-extinguishing paraphernalia in usable condition. 
[5] When the Public Liability Act was enacted in 1923, 
there were several decisions in this state dealing with the 
question of the liability of private water companies. Thus 
it had been held that neither a city (Ukiah v. Ukiah Water 
& Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173 [75 P. 773, 100 Am.St.Hep. 107, 64 
L.R.A. 231]) nor a private citizen (Niehaus Bros. Co. v. Contra 
Costa Water Co., 159 Cal. 305 [113 P. 375, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 
1045]) could recover damages from a water company for a 
property loss by fire due to the company's failure to maintain 
its water system properly. In the light of these decisions, 
of which the Legislature presumably had knowledge (23 Cal. 
Jur. § 159, p. 782; JJf1:ller v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 432, 439 
[110 P.2d 419, 134 A.L.R 1424]), it does not seem reasonable 
to construe the Public Liability Act as intended to impose a 
greater liability on the city than would prevail against an 
individual or a private corporation charged with negligence 
in the administration of its fire protection. (See Watson v. 
City of Alameda, 219 Cal. 331, 333 [26 P.2d 286] ; People v. 
S1.tperior Court, 29 Cal.2d 754,757 [178 P.2d 1] .) The "crush-
ing burden of such an obligation" will not be "imputed to the 
Legislature in the absence of language clearly designed to have 
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that effect." (Steitz v. City of Beacon, supra, 64 N.E.2d 
704, 707.) We find no language clearly designed to have 
that effect in the cited Public Liability Act of 1923. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Briefly, the question presented here is whether a municipal 
corporation is liable under our Public Liability Act (Gov. 
Code, § 53051) for the destruction by fire of plaintiff's home, 
by reason of its water main and hydrant used for fire pro-
tection becoming clogged, thus making it impossible to obtain 
sufficient water to quench the fire. The majority holds that 
the case does not come within that act. Certain principles 
are conceded: (1) That the city's fire prevention function is 
governmental rather than proprietary, and that in the absence 
of a statute there is no liability for a tort committed in the 
course of that activity by reason of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity; (2) that the liability act includes governmental 
as well as proprietary activities; ( 3) that the liability act 
covers cases where the injured person is using the dangerous 
or defective city property and also where the city is using its 
propedy or works and injury is proximately caused thereby; 
( 4) that the choked hydrant constituted a dangerous and 
defective condition in the city's property known by the city 
to exist; ( 5) that funds were available to repair said hydrant; 
( 6) and that such condition was the proximate cause of the 
destruction of plaintiff's house by. fire. 
How then does the majority reach the conclusion that the 
case is not covered by the Public Liability Act f The real 
basis appears to be that to apply it here would impose a 
"crushing burden" upon the city. Formally the decision is 
founded upon the reasoning that there was no liability at 
common law-no duty of care upon one, public or private, 
supplying water for extinguishing fires, to the inhabitants 
of the city. That reasoning appears chiefly from the cases 
of Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51 [64 N.E.2d 704, 163 
A.L.R. 342], and Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 
160 [159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199] relied upon and quoted 
in the majority opinion. In the Steitz case the statute involved 
was not a public liability act; it was nothing more than a 
waiver of sovereign immunity-of the privilege not to be 
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sued. Hence the court could not find a duty imposed upon 
the city to keep its property reasonably safe, from the mere 
statutory obligation of a city to supply fire protection, and 
none flowed from a. mere permission to be sued. There is 
further discussion in the same tenor, emphasis being laid on 
the governmental character of a city's obligation to furnish 
protection against fire. That argument is, of course, wholly 
beside the point, because the obligation is here imposed by the 
Public Liability Act to maintain all city property, whether used 
govet·nmentally or not, in a safe condition. 
The complete answer to all that discussion is that it is not 
the obligation of the city to maintain a fire department from 
which flows the duty to maintain its property in a safe condi-
tion. It is the liability act itself. This act constitutes more 
than a mere waiver of sovereign immunity which the court con-
sidered in the Steitz case. No exceptions are provided in this 
act. It says that cities shall be liable for any injuries to any 
person or property resulting from the dangerous or defective 
condition of its property or works. If there is a liability for 
such condition, there must necessarily be included therein a 
duty to maintain its property in a safe condition-a duty to all 
persons and to all owners of any property that may be injured 
by a breach of that duty, including inhabitants as well as 
others. The cases have uniformly held that the Public Liability 
Act created and imposed a duty upon the public agencies 
named to maintain their works and property in a nondangerous 
and nondefective condition, which is not affected or controlled 
by the common law. It is said in the first case decided by this 
court which considered the act : ''The legislature has removed 
from the consideration of the case all common law and archaic 
obstacles that formerly stood in the way of a citizen recov-
ering from a municipality damages for personal injuries 
suffered from dangerous and defective conditions of public 
streets, by adopting in 1923 ( Stats. 1923, p. 675), the following 
act ... the obligation of a city to make its highways reason-
ably safe for general use cannot be chartered away even 
though a municipality should attempt to do so." (Rafferty 
v. City of Marysville, 207 Cal. 657, 660 [280 P. 118] .) The 
District Court of Appeal in discussing the title of the act 
said:" [T]he second part [of the act], as the title also indi-
cates, creates an entirely new and different liability, to wit: the 
liability of the county,-making the county a legal entity, liable 
for the negligence of its officers in certain cases." (Italics by 
the court.) (Gorman v. County of Sacramento, 92 Cal.App. 
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656, 668 [268 P. 1083].) In dealing with the then section 
1623 of the Political Code imposing liability on school dis-
tricts for negligence the same as the Public Liability Act, this 
court said it (section 1623) "creates a liability on the the part 
of school districts for damages ... by reason of the negli-
gence of the school district .... " (Ahern v. Livermore 
Union High Sch. Dist., 208 Cal. 770, 782 [284 P. 1105].) 
We said in Fackrell v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal.2d 196, 209 
[157 P.2d 625, 158 A.L.l~. 625] : "Obviously, the city is not 
being held as an insurer of anything but it is being held to 
the standard of ordinary care in planning, constructing, and 
maintaining its streets and sidewalks. Liability for its failure 
in that regard is not due to the whimsy of court or jury; it is 
imposed by the public liability statute .... It now seeks to 
justify its conduct by announcing for itself a rule that it 
assumes no responsibility for the condition of the sidewalk 
and that pedestrians must use the same at their own risk. 
But its legal dtdy in the premises is defined by general law 
(Stats. 1923, p. 675; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1944, Act 5619) 
and negligence and liability therefor do not depend upon, and 
cannot be limited by, self-formulated standards." (Italics 
added.) This court discusses the question in detail in (Jibs on 
v. County of Mendocino, 16 Cal.2d 80, 84 [105 P.2d 105], in 
determining that the common law rules of liability were not 
applicable: ''In effect, it has been held that the rules with 
respect to the measure of care to be exercised by owners of 
private property toward invitees and licensees have no applica-
tion to the duty imposed by the stat1tte on a county, munici-
pality or school district to maintain public property in a safe 
condition. Thus, in the case of Castro v. S1dter Creek U. II. 
S. Dist., 25 Cal.App.2d 372, 377 [77 P.2d 509], where the 
issues involved the applicability of the same section of the act 
here concerned, the plaintiff, who had accompanied her two 
daughters to a dance held at an auditorium belonging to a 
school district, was shown to have received an injury because 
of having stepped into a hole as she was 'crossing over' a 
parkway or strip of land lying between the sidewalk and the 
curving adjoining a driveway which extended along the south 
side of the auditorium, which strip of land was owned by tbe 
school district, but was intended to be used only as a lawn 
plot or place for the planting of trees. In that case, where 
arguments were directed to the question whether at the time of 
the accident the injured person was a licensee or an invitee, 
the court ruled that the answer to that question was im-
I 
i 
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material and not determinative of the liability of the defend-
ants. The provisions of the section were there set forth to 
the effect that a county, municipality or school district is 
liable for injuries to persons and property resulting proxi-
mately from the dangerous or defective condition of public 
buildings, grounds, etc., in all cases where the government 
or managing board of such school district, county, municipality 
or person having authority to remedy such condition, had 
knowledge or notice of the defective or dangerous condition 
of any such buildings, grounds, etc., and within a reasonable 
time after acquiring such knowledge had failed to remedy such 
condition. The court in that case said that the provisions of 
the section 'base liability upon any act which leaves a place 
or condition dangerous or defective and liable to cause some 
injury to the general public', and that the section was 'de-
signed not for the safety, particularly, either of licensees or 
invitees. . . . ' '' 
There being a duty thus established by the liability act, 
there remains no reason why the act should not apply to this 
case. 
Reliance is placed by the majority, however, on cases de-
cided before the 1923 liability act, which it says hold that 
neither a city nor an individual could recover from a water 
company for a property loss by fire due to the company's 
failure to maintain its water system properly (Ukiah v. Ukiah 
Water & Imp. Co., 142 Cal. 173 [75 P. 773, 100 Am.St.Rep. 
107, 64 L.R.A. 231]; Nichatts Bros Co. v. Contra Costa Water 
Co., 159 Cal. 305 [113 P. 375, 36 L.R.A. N.S. 1045]) and 
that the Legislature did not intend to abrogate that rule when 
it adopted the Public Liability Act. 'l'he latter premise is at 
least dubious for there are no except1:ons in the scope of the 
liability act. It does not say that it is right for the city to 
maintain dangerous and defective property used for fire 
fighting. In any event, these cases are clearly wrong. The 
inaccuracy of those cases is ably pointed out in referring to 
Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., snpra, 247 N.Y. 160 [159 
N.E. 896, 62 .A.I •. R. 1199] : " ... Cardozo speaks of the 
failure of the water company as if it were merely a failure to 
confer a benefit upon the injured householder, and in denying 
liability relies upon the recognized principle that one is under 
no duty to confer a benefit upon another. Of course, the 
plaintiff did not complain of the failure to receive a benefit. 
His real ground was that, because of reliance upon the under-
taking of the water company to maintain an adequate pressure 
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at the hydrants, the city had failed to make other provision 
for the protection of its citizens, and the plaintiff, among 
others, being lulled into a false sense of security, had failed 
individually to take measures to protect his property. In 
substance, the situation does not differ from that where a 
train cuts a fire hose or blocks a street, so that the fire depart-
ment cannot extinguish a fire. In both cases the defendant 
has prevented a third person from rendering assistance. 
Where the act is after the beginning of the fire, there is an 
immediacy of need which does not exist in the waterworks 
situation, yet since it is well known that fires occur from 
time to time in any town large enough to afford waterworks, 
there would seem to be such a substantial risk of harm to the 
group of which the plaintiff is one as would make such cases 
directly in point. The risk to the individual plaintiff is less, 
but the chance of harm to any one of a large number is great. 
Furthermore, in the Moch case, it was alleged that the de-
fendant had failed to keep up the pressure after knowing of 
the fire. It had been held before the Moch case, as it has 
been held since, that the negligent breaking of a water 
main may be the basis of a cause of action in favor of a 
householder who had been thereby deprived of the assistance 
of the fire department in quenching a fire. Analogous are the 
cases where a railroad has undertaken more than its legal 
duty in supplying at a railroad crossing a watchman upon 
whose presence travelers frequently using the crossing have 
relied, and those where an agent in charge of a building has 
failed to keep it in repair, as a result of which a third person 
is injured. In these cases where the wrong consists of a 
failure to act, the older viewpoint was that since there is 
mere 'nonfeasance' and no direct obligation to the injured 
person, there can be no liability to him. The fallacy of this 
older point of view has been today generally exploded .... " 
(Cardozo and the Law of Torts, Professor Warren A.. Seavey, 
52 Harv.L.Rev., 372, 392.) Many more illustrations may 
be added to those suggested by Professor Seavey. The fire-
fighting equipment may be maintained in a dangerous and 
defective condition with full knowledge of the city officials-
brakes on the automotive equipment may be defective-
fire hoses may be defective and burst when water is run 
through them under pressure-hydrants may be broken off or 
burst from freezing and no effort made to repair them until 
water discharging therefrom damages private property. The 
liability aet was obviously intended to apply to situations such 
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as these. If such dangerous and defective conditions result 
in loss or damage to property by fire, why should it not be 
applied to extend protection to a person so damaged? To 
my mind there is no basis in reason, logic or common sense for 
the construction placed upon said act by the majority. Under 
the facts alleged in the complaint and not denied, plaintiffs 
lost their home as the direct and proximate result of the 
dangerous, defective and unsafe condition of the fire hydrant 
which was known by the city officials to exist and they failed 
to cause said condition to be repaired although funds were 
available for such purpose. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
SCHAUER, Dissenting.-I concur in the reasoning and con-
clusion of Justice Carter. 
I think the Public Liability Act (Stats. 1923, ch. 328, § 2, p. 
675) covers this case. The majority seek to distinguish the 
111any cases upholding and applying that statute by stating 
that ( p. 489) : "The ordinary case coming within the terms 
of this act involves a situation where the injured person is 
using some type of city property that is dangerous or de-
fective, and which he had a legal right to use, [citations and 
illustrations, such as using a defectively engineered or main-
tained street] ... Likewise the act sustains the imposition 
of liability in the situation where the city is using the danger-
ous or defective property and injury was proximately caused 
thereby . . . [citations and illustrations, such as negligently 
using defective sewer pipe and negligently maintaining street 
drainage facilities, contributing to the flooding of plaintiffs' 
property]. But here the city did not create the fire causing 
the damage to plaintiffs' property." 
It seems to me that the attempted differentiation is not 
legally sound or substantial. I would think that a house-
holder is "using" a fire hydrant and water supply when he, 
by himself or a city employe, attaches a hose to it· and runs 
the water to put out an incipient fire in his house. Surely that 
is a legal use of a facility for which as a taxpayer he is 
paying. Likewise, the fire department men, and through them, 
the city, are "using" that property when they connect the 
hose and run the water. And the defective condition of the 
fire hydrant just as surely contributes, under the circum-
stances shown here, proximately to cause the damage to 
plaintiffs' property by fire as does defective sewer pipe or 
drainage facilities contribute to cause damage in time of 
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flood. The majority say "the city did not create the fire 
causing the damage'' ; I point out that in the flood cases 
the city did not create the water which caused the damage, 
nor even the law of gravity which impels water to seek a lower 
level by a direct route. 
It is just as much a natural result for a fire, not extinguished, 
to consume a house built of combustible materials as it is for 
flood waters, not diverted or safely carried away, to damage 
property, subject to erosion or seepage, which lies in their 
path. Sewers are maintained to (among other uses) safely 
carry away flood waters; water mains and fire hydrants are 
maintained to (among other uses) extinguish fires. A. house-
holder in a city pays taxes to obtain, among other things, fire 
protection as well as flood protection. The Public Liability 
Act imposes tort liability on the city for negligently main-
taining its property in a defective condition when such con-
dition proximately causes damage while the property is being 
lawfully used for its designed purpose. All the conditions 
for liability imposed by the statute are met here. 
This court has been liberal (sometimes, I have felt, more 
than liberal) in construing statutes and the common law to 
advance the outposts of tort liability as against private citi-
zens and private corporations. 1 I think that such liberality 
of extension-in this case an obviously discretionary inter-
pretation and application of the statute-should more justly 
be indulged as against the state and municipal corporations 
than as against private individuals and corporations. 
I should reverse the judgment. 
1 See e.g-.: Hunt v. A1lthier (1946), 28 Cal.2d 288 [169 P.2d 913, 171 
A.L.R. 18"i9]; .Johnston v. Long (194'1), 30 Oal.:?d 54, ill [181 P.2d 64!)]; 
Ra/Jer v. '1'1m~in (19;)1), 36 Cal.2d 654 [226 P.2d 574]; Pete1·son v. Burk· 
halter (Hl.i~), B.'\ Cal.2d 107. 114 1237 P.2d 977]; srcc, also, Rippe v. 
City of Los Angeles (HJ42), 50 Cal.App.2d 189 [123 P.2d 47]. 
